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IN THE SUP·REME COURT
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM D. BAXTER,
Deceased.

I

Case
No.10216

Petitioner's and Respondent's Brief

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves the question of whether or not
the Testator, William D. Baxter, had mental capacity
to make a Will at the time of its execution.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Trial Court found that William D. Baxter was
competent and admitted the Will to probate.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellants seek a reversal of the Trial Court's
Judgment and the Respondent herein seeks the affirmation of the Trial Court's Judgment.
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STATEMENT OF F AOTS :

In' general, the' Respondent agrees with the facb:ras

outlined in th·~ Appellknt's Brief but since certain:· facts
~hbtifd~: ·be· -~Htrified ritore' fully ·!rom ·thH Respondent's
standpoint~ an·· additioli;1l stafement will 'be made by the
:Re·s:poiident herein:
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William D. Baxter and Flora Baxter, his wife, l~ad
resided in American Fork, Utah, for a number or ye~i~:.
During tJ!e time of their residency in American Fork,
th~y·: Oiuid -~cculll~lated a: i~:~a~o~able· estate. Flo'i·a~ lBaxie~; th~' firstw'ife Willia"m :Saxter, died on MW':3b,
1957.
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After the death of Flora Baxter,
William ri.''~ax! ';
~e.r _cQ_rrespond~d wit~ ·Ruth B~r:n.., a widow who li~~d i~
;_:
'
~ngland_,- anc;l .a~ter some correspondence, he pr(~p~s~(d
to .her and invited h.er to come over to the United States
to marry him. She ·came to the United States and m~rried William D. Baxter on Apr1115, 1958. (Tr. 31} ·.
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William Dee Baxter and .Flora Baxter had two. SO!lS
a~ . the iss-o.H pf. their_ marriage, Gilbert John Baxt~r,. .~J;ld
William F. Ba;xter, who died in the spring of· 196-0~r William. F .. _Baxte:r, the son, . le~t surviving. him thr€(-e. c}Jjldr~n.who .are th.e grandchildren and the Protestants.to
the admission of the Will in this particular cas~~ . '.-~P~
surviving son, Gilbert J. Baxter, and the second wife,
the->surviving widow, Ruth Baxter, are seeking to susfai~ the admission 'of the 'ViiL ·(R 13)
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"Bill" Baxter. was a man· in his eighties in 1960
and. prior to 1959 had enjoyed reasonaply good health for
a: ~an of his age· as te~tified. to .:bY. his. perso.;nai .~physi
cian.. (Tr..8) In 1959, he. was hospitaliz.ed with wb~t. .his
d~ctor termed an. irregularit:y of .tJ;te, 4~a:rt,which subs~quently threw an ''embolus'' and whi~~t cause.d.. a. weftkness of the right side of his body. The doctor testified,
''This was . not the paTalysis, this was .a weakness.''
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(T.r~·s)
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.,~~{.DJiring his lifetim~, Wil~iam:·D. Baxter had· 3:ccumu~
·'
'
.
·.:
. ..
·'
'
.
.
..
'·
l&teq_some income-producing properties .and _he had con~~y~d -some of these. properties .to his granddaughters
··.,,5Ji·t.J.

but reserved the right to have the income from the rental
of t-pese properties, by a verbal agreement, during his
life,time. (Tr. 40-41) Subseq~ently and after his illness,
the;>granddaughters in~isted and took over the· income
1
from
.ihese properties. (Tr. 85) Thereafter, William D.
""
Baxter ·made a Will which is the subject matter of this
lawsuit, which Will is dated .the 26th day of April, 1960,
in which he devised certain parcels of property to William F. Baxter {who was still alive at that time) and
Gilbert Baxter and the remainder of his property to his
wife,)Ruth Baxter. This Will was witnessed by Guy A.
Ri~hards, his attending physician, Donald S. Ryder, his
clergyman, and 0. DeVere Wootton, his attorney. (R. 9)
Before the signatures of the attesting witnesses appears
the ·following:
,
- >).,''. ("1' .::.

"
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;.i!(1~o

" ..

''This instrutnent was on the. day . and da.te
hereof signed, published aJ1d declared by the said
testator, William D. Baxter, to be his Last Will
3
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and Testament in the presence of us who at his
request have subscribed. our names hereto as witnesses in his presence and in the presence of ea.ch
other.
''At the time· of -the execution of this ins'trument the said testator was of sound and disposing
mind and had a clear understanding of the nature
of the instrument being signed, and was not acting under any menace or undue influence.''
William D. Baxter, on the 29th day of June, 1963,
died in American Fork, Utah, and the Petition for his
Admission of the Will to Probate was filed with the
Clerk of the Court on August 28, 1963. (R. 3)
On October 2, 1963, Lois Thomas, one of the g~and
daughters, filed a. Protest to the Petition to the Admiss~on of the Will to Probate. In the Protest filed by
the granddaughter, she alleges that on or about the
26th day of April, 1960, that William D. Baxter was
incompetent to execute the Will and that ''at all times
hereafter was not of sound mind but was of unsound
mind, incompetent and incapable because of unsoundness of mind and incompetency; that said unsoundness
of mind and incompetency are so by reason of an excessive brain hemorrhage or stroke sustained by the said
William D. Baxter on or about the 17th of June, 1959,
from which he never recovered and the effect of which
was to render him of unsound mind and lack of capacity
to execute a Last Will and Testament from that date
until his death.'' (R. 10)
Gilbert Baxter and Ruth Baxter both answered the
Protest of Lois Thomas and a Notice of Trial was
4
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filed on the 13th day of November, 1963, setting the
matter down for a trial without jury for March 11,
1964, at 10:00 o'clock a.m. On March 27, 1964, the
matter was rescheduled for trial for April 30, 1964.
(R. 24) On the 21st day of Ap·ril, 1964, new objections
to the Admission of the Will were filed by the grandchildren. The new objections to the Admission of the
Will to Probate outlined as the grounds for the objections: (1) That the Will was not witnessed at the end
thereof ; (2) that the witnesses were limited to signing their names and could not use the additional language showing the testamentary capacity; and (3) "That
on the 26th day of April, 1960, the time of the execution
of the alleged Will of William D. Baxter, he was not
competent to make a Last Will and Testament because
of the unsoundness of his mind and lack of capacity to
understand the effect of his signing the alleged will.''
(R. 23) In the Objections to the Admission of the Will,
it is further alleged in Paragraph 5 that William D. Baxter had suffered a severe heart attack and a brain hemorrhage which ''rendered him of unsound mind and
memory.'' In Paragraph 6, it is alleged that ''because
of the unsoundness of his mind and lack of capacity to
understand the effect of his signing the alleged Will'' that
he was not competent to make the Last Will and Testament. Paragraph 7 alleges that Ruth Baxter was married to William D. Baxter in April of 1958. Paragraph
8 alleges that Mr. Baxter had a sum in excess of One
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) deposited in
various bank accounts. Paragraph 9 alleges that Mrs.
Baxter, shortly after their marriage, '' ... began an at-

5
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tempt

Jo, secure all· of the money in which

Baxter had any

Willia~:·:·;o.

i~terest

. . . that the said Ruth Baxter,
by menaee and undue influence,. secured the tra.nsf~~'::to
her of all of the money and certain other property in
which. ,the ,said William D. Baxter had any interest.''· Paragrap:U·-_10 · ~lleges'that _bec;;tus.e- of the property be~~g
wrongf1;1lly transferred to. Ruth Baxter the esta.t.e had
t4e right _to recover the money, and then they pray .i4at
th~ W,ill be ~ec~ared invalid. (R. 21-24)

The· ease was then ·set f tir: tri~l on April 30, 196.4, before the Honorable Maurice~ Harding, a.t which trial w1tne~ses and evid.~nce. were produced and the Court found
the issues in favor of the Petitioner and admitted the
Will to Probate.

During the course of the trial, the Respondents.(Petitioners in the Trial Court) called as one of their witnesses Dr. Guy A. Richards, a physician and surgeo.~ and
also Sup-erintendent of the Utah State Training School,
who resided in American Fork. (Tr. 5) Dr. Richar4s ~es
tified that he had had. special training in the field .of retarded. childre:p: and .. mental disturbances and was well
qualified in this area. ,(Tr. 6) That he was one 9f: the
witnesses
to the Will of William D. Baxter and it was
his
.
.
opinion that William D. Baxter was of sound and dispo~ing mind at th.e time he exeeuted the Will. {Tr. 7}: Dr~
R·iehards, said that he bad seen. William D. Baxter on an
average of about once a month from 1955 until the time
of his death. (Tr. 7) Dr. Richards referred to the heart
disturbance that ¥r. Baxter l\ad had in 1959 and that he,
Dr. Richards., had attended to ~fr .. Baxter .during, that
.'.

,.

.

.·

'

.
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tim~~-

He was asked whether- or not this had- any ·effect
on the mental capacity of Mr. Baxter, and the -Doctor testified, ''I think not.'' ( Tr. 9)
'·''Mr. 0. DeVere Wootton was called as a witness. He
was the ;attorney who prepared the Will and repre.sented
M't. Baxter during his lifetime. He was well acquainted
with Mr. Baxter during his lifetime. Don Ryder, the
other witness to the Will, w·as Mr. Baxter's clergyman.
:M;r. ,r,Wootton testified that the Will was executed in the
regular fashion as required by statute, (Tr. 18) and that
he ~lso observed the condition of Mr. Baxter at the time
of..the execution of the Will and said in his opinion, Mr.
Baxter was alert and said that he was in excellent mental
condition at the time of the execution of the Will. (Tr.
19120)
: f ! ~

•

.

.

.-

.

.

.

Edith Grace Hamaker, one of the Protestants to the
Will, was called as a witness by the Appellants herein,
and she testified regarding three particular incidences
of her grandfather. One of which was that she calle<1
him to tell him that he had the new granddaughter and
that-her grandfather, on the telephone, didn't seem very
excited about it and just more or less grunted. She testified that following his illness Mr. Baxter, " . . . well,
after his illness, he just didn't seem like the same man,
and he said some things that didn't make sense." (Tr.
36) · Nevertheless, following his illness-, she had dealt
with the grandfather regarding the rents ·on some properties and proceeded to take over the rental linits that
had been owned by the grandfather. {Tr. 41-42)
7
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On cross-examination, she was asked, "Well, don't
you base a lot of your opinion upon the fact that you say
he stooped when he walked, and he held his head in his
hands, and that sort of thing~''
Answer: ''Yes.''
Question: ''And this is what causes you to really
think he was not competent, isn't it~"
Answer : ''Besides the things he said that didn't
make sense. ''
Question: ''Now these things that he said that
didn't make: sense was with reference to when
you told him about your grandchild on the
same day that the Will was executed~''
Answer: ''Yes.''
Question: "And the only thing that happened
there was that you only got a grunt from him
over the phone, is that correct~''
Answer: "Yes. It was an awful weak voice, too."
(Tr. 44)
Mr. George Hackford was called as a witness for the
Protestants in the Trial Court and was asked his opinion
about Mr. Baxter and he said, "In my opinion 'Bill'
wasn't as sharp as he was previously.'' (Referring to his
condition following his illness in 1959.) (Tr. 54) And except for the fact that he thought Mr. Baxter did not recognize him as to who he was on one occasion, he had nothing further to indicate anything about Mr. Baxter's
condition.
The next witness called by the Protestants was ~ir.
Wayne Hamaker who is the husband of Edith Grace
Hamaker, one of the Protestants. He testified that on

8
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one occasion he did not think that Mr. Baxter recognized
who he wa.s (R 63), that Mr. Baxter certainly wasn't himself after his illness ( Tr. 64), and that his main opinion
about whether or not Mr. Baxter had all of his mental
faculties was the fact that his mind would wander back
to the Eureka area, which was the area of his childhood.
(Tr. 71)
On cross-examination, in response to the question of
m~ntal competency, he said, ''I feel that any time a man's
mind wanders to a point of going back to his childhood
he, certainly isn't competent to make a declaration as
important as a Will.''
''Question: ''And that was what you based your
conclusion upon when you say he was incompetent7''
Answer: "That's right." (Tr. 72-73)
Lois Marie Baxter Thomas, one of the granddaughters and Protestants to the Will, was also called as a
witness by the Protestants, and the only thing she could
say about her grandfather is that following his illness
"he just didn't act like he used to before." (Tr. 77)
Other witnesses were called by the Protestants who
testified, in substance, to the same things. Mr. 0. DeVere
Wootton was recalled as a rebuttal witness to testify
about Mr. Baxter's condition and his ability to recall his
property and to remember the persons who were the
natural objects of his bounty.

9
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT MADE NO ERROR /IN
·ADMITTING THE WILL TO PROBATE
SINCE THE WILL WAS WITNESSED IN
THE MANNER AS PROVIDED BY LAW.
.

'

The Protestants, Appellants herein, have objected
to the Admission of the Will on the grounds that it wa.s
no~ properly ~tness~d since the witnessing had the language. preceding the signatures ·of the witnesses to the
effect that at the time of the execution of the Will the
Testator was of sound and disposing mind. Protestants
argue, therefore, that this is taking from the Court the
prerogative of its determination of whether or not the
Testator had legal capacity to execute the Will and tha.t
it is not at the end of the Will as required by law. Certainly, there is nothing wrong with the witnesses proclaiming the fact in the attestation to the Will that they
are satisfied of the mental competency of the Testator.

P(J)ge on. Wills, Lifetime Edition., Vol. 1, Sec. 351, in
discussing the formalities of execution states as follows:
~'According

to the great weight of authority,
the· subscribing witnesses are required to attest
the capacity of the testator to make a will. This
includes capacity as to age, sanity, and freedom
from undue influence. ·This point is often misunderstood by the witnesses who think that they
are attesting only the legal formalities of the execution. Such witnesses may, however, assume the
sanity of a testator if they know no facts which
would tend to show that he was insane.''

10
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This Court, in the case of In re Swan's Esta.te, 51
Utah 410, 170 Pac. 452, at page 456, had the following to
say regarding the duty of the ~ubscribing witnesses:

''In considering the evidence and its· sufficiency

it must not be overlooked that the· fun~tions and
·duties of subscribing witnesses to a will in this
state, and perhaps in most of the states, are not
alone to witness the signature of the testator and
formal execution of the will, but they must, at the
same time, pass upon the question of his sa;nity
and testamentary capacity." (Emphasis added)
I

This same rule of law was followed in the Kansas
case of F~tller v. Williams, 125 Kan. 154, 264 Pac. 77, in
·which case the Court stated as follows :
''But witnessing a will is a matter of great importance and solemnity. Riee v. Monroe, 108 Kan.
526, 527, 196 P.- 756. One who attests and subscribes a will as a witness should do so with the
understanding that he is competent to testify on
the probate of the will that the testator had mental
capacity to make a will and was not under restraint or undue influence. Lawrie v. Lawrie, 39
Kan. 480, 18 P. 499; Hospital Co. v. Hale, 69
Kan. 616, 619, 77 P. 537; McConnell v. Keir, 76
Kan. 527, 531, 92 P. 540. The attesting witnesses
to a will must not only witness the signing or publishing of it by the testator, but it is also their dutv
to satisfy themselve-s that the testa tor is of sound
_and disposing mind and memory and capable of
executing a will. .Smith et al. v. Young et al., 134
Miss. 738, 99 So. 370, 35 A. L. R., 69; In re Swan's
Estates, 51 Utah 410, 170 P. 452. 'A witness to
a will must * * * satisfy himself * * • of his (the
testator's testamentary capacity.' 40 Cyc. 1110;
Dunkeson v. Williams (Mo. Sup.) 242 S. W. 653;
11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Shouler on Wills (6th Ed.) Sec. 229, 524; Page on
Wills ( 2d Ed.) Sec. 332. And see cases collected
in annotation 35 A. L. R. 79. This duty necessarily
requires that the attesting witnesses to a will
should know and understand that the instrument
they are signing as witnesses is a will, and they
should do so prepared to testify to the testamentary capacity of the testator and that he is free
from restraint and undue influence.''
''Even 'the attestation of a signature to a will,
or other document, is a direct assertion by the
witness that the maker is competent to understand
and execute it.' Snyder's Estate, 279 Pa. 63, 123
A. 663." (In re Keen's Estate, 299 Pa. 430, 149
A. 737.)
Although the Appellants argue in this case that the
addition of the language where the witnesses state that
the Testator was of sound and disposing mind invalidates
the Will, a case in Washington (In re Chafey's Estate,
167 Wash. 185, 8 P. 2d 959) is a case in which the witness
to the will did nothing but sign their names and put their
address after their name without any further or addi..
tional statement, and the Court of Washington held that
this will was void and of no effect because ''It was the
duty of the attesting witnesses, under the statute, to observe and see that the will was executed by the Testator,
and that he had capacity to execute the will.'' And then
the Court went on to say:
"It will be noted. that, while the instrument
offered for probate contains the signatures of the
decedent and two other persons, there is no semblance of an attestation clause as the statute requires. Nowhere in the instrument is the word
'attest' or the 'vord 'witness' or any word of any

12
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similar import. The writing does not contain any
form of attestation clause which would constitute
prima facie evidence that the instrument was
signed by Fisher and Brooks as witnesses in the
presence of the testator by his direction or request. If there were an attestation clause- in conformity to the statute, and the will bore the genuine signature of the testator (the signature is
conceded to be- that of Mr. Chafey), that would be
prima facie evidence of the due execution of the
will. The fact that the subscribing witnesses were
dead, insane, or were beyond the jurisdiction of
the court would not defeat the validity of the
will, if in fact it was duly executed. In such case
the court may admit proof of the handwriting of
such witness, and admit the instrument to probate as though it had been proved by such subscribing witness in his or her proper person.''
Obviously, therefore, the attesting witnesses to the
Will have a greater function than simply putting their
signatures upon the page. The Appellants, in their argument, would have you believe that all the witness had
to do was simply sign his name upon the sheet and, as the
Washington Court has indicated, this would invalidate
the WilL The witness has a function of attesting to the
Will which means more than simply placing his signature
upon the sheet, and to include in the attestation clause
the language that the witnesses were satisfied that the
Testator was of sound and disposing mind only carried
out the function which the witnesses are obligated to bear
when they sign as attesting witness to a Will.

A serious question is raised as to the admissibility
of testimony of subscribing witnesses who attempt to
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testify that the Testator was incompetent. This matter is
discussed in 57 Am. Jur. "Wills," Sec. 145, at page 133,
as follows:
''It is generally held that when an attesting
witness attempts to impeach a will by testifying
that the testator did not have testamentary capacity, his evidence will be received with suspicion
and the utmost caution, especially where the attestation clause declares the competency of the
testator. Such testimony is deemed to reflect on
the credibility of the witness. The theory is that
the fact that a person voluntarily identifies him. ~elf with the execution of a will and a witness is an
indication that, in his opinion, the person executing the instrument is competent so to do. Accord·ing to some authority, no weight should be given
to the testimony of an attesting witness that denies the mental competency of the testator. But
the suspicion which attaches to the testimony of
a subscribing witness impeaching the will on the
ground of mental incompetency of the testator is
removed by evidence that the witness was called
upon to act suddenly and did not have time to
deliberate, or that he acted for the purpose of
pacifying and indulging an incompetent testator.
In any event, the weight to be given the opinion
of a subscribing witness that the testator was unsound mentally depends upon the intelligence of
the witness and the opportunity accorded him for
observation.'' (Emphasis added)
The Appellants make an argument in their Brief
that the witnesses did not sign at the end of the Will as
provided by law and that the Testator didn't sign a.t the
end of the Will as provided by law since this additional
information was put in the attestation clause.
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Page on Wills, Lifetime Edition, Vol. 1, Sec. 290,
makes reference to the place of the signature in reference
to the- attestation clause and says as follows:
''Questions as to signing at the end are presented where testator signs above the testimonium
clause, or below th-e attestation clause, or in blanks
in one of these clauses~ In most jurisdictions the
a.ttestation cla.use is not regarded as a part of the
will, but rather as a certificate to the will; and,
accordingly, the signature of the testator may
either precede or follow such clause and yet be at
the end of the will. In the ordinary form of a will,
testator's signature precedes the attestation
clause. A signature of this sort is a signature at
the· end of the will.'' (Emphasis added)
· ·::,.~he matter of the place of the signatures of the witnes~es is discussed in 57 Am. Jur. "Wills," Sec. 348, p.
257, as follows:
''The better opinion is that the signature of
the witnesses are properly placed, within the
meaning of a statute which states that the witnesses shall sign at the end, if they are practically
and substantially at the end of the instrument. If
the signatures of witnesses are placed in such a
position with relation to the concluding words of
the will as to warrant a reasonable inference that
they were· placed where they appeared solely for
the purpose of attesting the execution of the will,
they comply with the statutory requirement that
they shall be at the end of the will. Moreover, as
hereinbefore appears in the discussion regarding
the place for the testator's signature, some courts
hold that the 'end of the will,' within the meaning of a statute which prescribes signing at the
end, is the logical, rather than the physical or spatial, end of the wilL
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''Clearly, a.n attestation cla.use intervenring between the testator's signature and the signatures
of the witnesses does not invalidate the latter.
Moreover, there is a signing by the witnesses at
the end of the will, although the attestation clau~e
is carried entirely across the face of· the instrument, and separates the testator's signature from
the signatures of the witnesses. (Emphasis added)
See also Annotation. "Wills: Place of signature of
attesting witnesses,'' 10 A. L. R. 429.
The very cases cited by the Appellants regarding
where the signature of the witnesses attesting to the Will
should be support the proposition that the Will in this
particular case is properly executed. Admittedly the
statute of the State of Utah requires that the witnesses
must sign his name as a witness at the "end of the will."
Appellants argue that because of the attestation clause
being included in this Will that the Will has not been
properly executed by the witnesses at the end of the Will.
The case of In re Moro's Estate, 183 Cal. 29, 190 Pac.
168, is a ease in which the attestation clause was on a
separate sheet from the sheet on which the Testator had
signed at the end of the sheet as his Will and then the
attestation clause was on a separate sheet with the signatures of the witnesses on a separate sheet, both of
which sheets \vere stapled together. The California
Court held that the Will \Yas properly executed at the
end thereof by the Testator and that it was properly exeeuted by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause
and the same "ra.s at the end of the Will. This case \ras
cited and followed in an Oklahoma case, In re Dunlap's
16
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Will, 87 Okl. 95, 209 Pae. 651, in which the same question
was raised a.s to whether or not there had been compliance
with the statute where the witnesses had signed after the
attestation clause and on a separate sheet of paper, and
the Oklahoma Court stated as follows:

''We conclude that the mere fact that the attestation clause and signature of the "\Vitnesses are
on a sheet or page following that on which the
testator affixed his signature is immaterial. This
conclusion is supported by In re Moro 's Estate,
183 Cal. 29, 190 Pac. 168, 10 A. L. R. 422, wherein
the court, in construing section 1276, Civil Code
of California, which is identical with section 8348,
Rev. Laws 1910, held:
" 'The fact that the attestation clause was on
a separate sheet from the concluding provisions
of the will and the signature of testator, though
there was a sufficient blank space on that sheet,
does not invalidate the will, where the sheets were
fastened together in proper order so that the attestation clause was upon the sheet immediately
following that containing the end of the will.' ''
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN HOLDING THAT NO ISSUE WAS
RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS AS TO UNDUE INFLUENCE IN THE EXECUTION OF
THE WILL.
At the outset, it should be noted that Point II Taised
by the Appellant only raises the issue of whether or
not there was undue influence in securing the transfer to
Mrs. Baxter of certain assets by Mr. Baxter during his
lifetime. During the course of the trial, the Protestants

17

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

attempted to introduce some evidence to the effect that
there may have been a question about whether or not
Mrs. Baxter exercised undue influence upon Mr. Ba.xter
in getting him to execute the Will. This evidence "ras rejected by the Court.
.,

As set out in the Statement of Facts in this Brief, the
objections to the introduction of the Will were all predicated upon the grounds that 1\1r. Baxter did not have
mental capacity in which to make the Will at the time of
the execution of the Will. The procedure for contest~ng
a Will is set out in the Utah Code in U. C. A. 75-3-7, and
provides as follows :
''If any one appears to contest the will, he
must file written grounds of opposition to the probate thereof, and serve a copy on the petitioner
and on the proposed executor, if he is not the
petitioner, and shall mail notices of such contest
to the heirs. Any one or more of such persons
may demur thereto upon any of the grounds of
demurrer provided in the Code of Civil Procedure.
If the demurrer is sustained, the court must allow
the contestant a reasonable time, not exceeding
ten days, within which to amend his written opposition. If the demurrer is overruled, the petitioner and others interested may, within such time
as the court may allow, jointly or separately
answer the contestant's grounds, traversing or
otherwise obviating or avoiding the objections."
(Emphasis added)
At no place in the objections to the introduction of
the Will do the Protestants claim that Ruth Baxter exercised undue influence on William Baxter in the execution
of the Will. Admittedly, the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
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cedure provide for Ii])er~Iity of pl~.ading; .however,, even
in the; Utah Rules of Civil Procedure certain matters
must.·be
pleaded with par~icularity. (See Rule 8 B anp
.
G aAd also Rule 9) Ho,vever, this matter. is set forth
specifically in the Probate Code as to tl:le proc~d~re in
filing a contest of the introduction of a. Will. The matter
of a contest on the prob~te of a Will is in the nature of a
speci~l proceeding and the forms of pleading, to the ext~!ftth~t tl1ey are specifically provided by statute, should
be l6liowed. (See Baineroft's· Pr'obate Practicf3, 2d Ed.,
Vol~ -1, ·sec. 182, p. 444.)
.

'

.'·

-

.

_,

~..

'

· ....
"-·

•
Undue influence must be pleaded specifically, and it
18 ·not sUfficient to make a general
allegation. Bancroft's
.
Prob:a.te Practice, 2d Ed., -Vol. 1, Sec. 187, 8456, in refer~nce to the matter of alleging undue influence, states
as follows:
'

'

'

(··~,',._

-

~ ·,'.

''Where the ground of contest is undue in· fluence it is not sufficient for the pleader merely
to allege the legal conclusion of undue influence,
, but facts must be pleaded from which the court
may determine as a matter of law whether the
facts so pleaded constitute the claimed undue in, fluence. ''·

Page;on Wills_, Lifetime Edition, Vol. 2, Sec. 631,
stated as follo,vs: ·
"Fraud, mistake, and unque influence cannot.
· be alleged in general terms; but the facts which
amount to such fraud, mistake, or undue influence
·must be set forth sp·ecifically."
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The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 81 B, specifically
provides:
''These rules shall not apply to proceedings
in uncontested probate and guardianship matters,
but shall app.Zy to all proceedings subsequent to
the joinder of issue therein, including the enforcement of any judgment or order entered.'' (Emphasis added)
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF 0. DEVERE
WOOTTON, THE ATTORNEY FOR MR. BAXTER, AS TO CONVERSATIONS HE HAD
WITH WILLIAM BAXTER AFTER THE ALLEGED WILL WAS EXECUTED.
During the course of the trial, the proponents of
the Will put on the witnesses to testify as to the prima
facie case required to admit the Will to probate. Following this the Protestants then called their witnesses
in attempting to show that the Testator lacked testamentary capacity to execute the Will. They tried to show this
by sa~ng that Mr. Baxter, in his illness in 1959, sustained
a brain injury which prevented him from having testamentary capacity thereafter. It therefore became quite
material to the lawsuit as to the condition of Mr. Baxter
following his illness in 1959 and particularly at the
execution of the Will in 1960. Some of the witnesses testified that his condition following his illness in 1959 remained the same up until the time of his death. ~Ir.
Wootton, the attorney, was called to rebut the statements
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made by these witnesses and to show that Mr. Baxter was
aware of his property, knew who the beneficiaries of his
estate were to be, and was clear of mind as to the disposition he was making of his property in connecti~n with this
Will. (In reSwarn/sEsta.te,4 Utah2d277, 293Pac.2d683.)
This conversation with Mr. Wootton took place on J nne
1, 1960, a little more than one month after the execution
of the Will and shortly after the death of his son in May
of 1960. This conversation related to the way that Mr.
Baxter was aware of the assets he had, the beneficiaries
of his estate, and could recall to mind the property and
the disposition he was making of his property.
The only question raised by the Protestants (Appellants) in their Brief is whether or not Mr. Wootton can
testify regarding conversations following the execution
of the Will. The question of whether or not an attorney may testify regarding the execution of the Will has
been laid to rest by many cases, and the Utah Court
has definitely followed the procedure that there is no
privilege in communications regarding the execution of
the Will. (See In re Young's Estate, 33 Utah 382, 94 Pac.
731) We submit, however, this privilege of communication is a privilege solely to the Testator and the Testa tor,
having passed on, the privilege is no longer available and
especially is this true in Will contest cases. The privile~e
in Will contest cases did not apply at Common Law, and
our statute is no broader than the Common Law; therefore, insofar as a Will contest case is concerned, the
matter of privilege does not exist. This Court held in
In re Young, supra, as follows:
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''The privilege was' not extended to will con~
·tests at· common law,· and, as our statute is no
. broader than the common law upon the su'Q.j.ect,
we have no right, even if we were inclined to do
so, to extend the priVilege to will contests.'' : · '
·.:This discussion with the Testator and his attor1ley
took place, as indic.ated, ·approximately a month a.ftd· a
half after the execution of the Will, and he came into the
attorney's office- to discuss with him his Will that he had
made ..( Tr. 178-179) F.urther~ore, at this time he b~~ught
with him Mrs. Baxter: wh~ was present during the conv~r~
satlon, ~ndwhethe{~he stayed ill the room all during tlu•
conversation or not IS not recalled by the attorneY::. (Tr.
178) We recognize the rule that the attorney in a Will con~
test case would not be at liberty to disclose confidenti;;tl in~oxomation. given -him by the client that is unrelated
en.tirely to the Will, but we subrpit in this particular c.ase
that the client came in to discuss ·his '\Vill further and to.
discuss his property and consider what action should be
taken regarding the Will, even though it was after the
preparation-of the Will, and that this conversation is all
tie.d, into the matter of the. Will and in a. Will contest
should not be considered as privileged communications.
Furthermore, since Mrs. Baxter was present during this.
discussion or at least part of it, the matter is not p?vileged. We refer to the case of Anderson v. Thomas~ 108
Utah 252, 159 Pac. 2d 1942, \vhich follows the authority
o:f the case cited.above, In re Youn.g's Estate, a.nd recognizes .that in a Will contest case there is no privilege.
I-Iowe,"'er, in that case, it was a~ matter of a contest wheth-'
er ·or not undue influence had been exercised in the execu~
I

•

·. .

•

.

f·.) ·..

.
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tiO.:tl: of a. D.eecJ and th-e: C~urt ~deteriD.ined. that there vvas
no privilege because the. related· communications were
g~ven ·in the presence :of third parties and, further, they
!·(Hated t~ the execution of.th~ Deeq·.:tb.which tli~ attorney was:.a witnes~, and f~rthermore.th~t._the co~~unicat~QP.~· . ~ere in the C01J!Se :·of e~ploJ1?ent "\vhi~~ th~. client

di<l n,~t desire to have
municatioris ..

t~em

particularly confidential com-

. . Furthermore, in this ease the ·~ttorney for the Protesta.nts cross-examined the witness at length regarding
these· transactions and statements about th·e Testator and
;'' ' ;' . . 1'
'
'
liis. aff~irs with his granddaughters. He, theref~re,
wa:ived any objection. (Tr. 188-192)
~
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· · :.certainly the Protestants have no more right to
claim ·the privilege than does the Petitioner-Respondent
herein have the right to ·waive the-privilege. In the matt~r ·herein, all of the parties are claiming under the same
person, and that person is deceased. The matter of priYilege should be only a conditional privilege as referred to
by: Professor Wigmore in 8 Wigmore on. Eridence, Sec.
2314, ·wher.ein he says it should be only a "temporary
confidentiality'' not intended to require s·ecrecy after the
death of the Testator.
,-.· In this case, any, attempt by part of the heirs to ex~
elude testimony, bearing. on. the T·estator's c~~dition
'vould . only be for the purpose of ,benefiting their interest.
and, .<:lenying the full truth to be heard by the Court.!
Other .courts have recognized that when the dispute is
b~tween the parties claiming under the Testator the
'

I

'

23

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

privilege should not apply since this prevents the Court
from possibly getting the full truth.
See Olsson v. Pierson,, 237 Iowa 1342, 25 N.W. 2d 357;
Win,ters v. Winters, 102 Iowa 53, 71 N.W. 184; see also
97 C. J. 8., "Witnesses," Sec. 288.
The Iowa Court, in the case of Winters v. Winters,
supra, stated the law as follows:
''At common law confidential communications
to a physician were not privileged, and they are
only so made by statute. Those to an attorney,
however, were privileged, and it was held that
the attorney might not divulge without the consent of the client while living, but that, after his
death, in a contest between a stranger and an heir,
devisee, or personal representative, the latter
might waive the privilege and examine the attorney concerning the confidential communications,
though the stranger was not permitted to do so;
and, in a controversy betw·een heirs at law, devisees, and personal rep·resentatives, the claim
that the communication was privileged could not
be urged, because, in such a case, the p·roceedings
were not adverse to the estate, and the interest of
the deceased as well as of the estate was that the
truth be ascertained. Hageman, Privil. Com. Sec.
84; Russell v. Jackson, 9 Hare, 387 ; In re Layman's Will, 40 Minn. 371, 42 N.W. 288, Scott v.
Harris, 113 Ill. 451 ; Doherty v. 0 'Callaghan, 157
Mass. 90, 31 N.E. 726; Blackburn v. Crawfords, 3
Wall. 175.'' (Emphasis added)
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CONCL.USION
We respectfully submit that in this case the evidence
fully bears out the Trial Court's position, and since this
is a case at law, this Court should affirm the decision of
the Trial Court.
Respectfully submitted,

O.DEVEREWOOTTON
Suite 12, Geneva Building
American Fork, Utah
DEAN E. CONDER
NIELSEN, CONDER AND HANSEN
510 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Responden.ts
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